Experience with complex systems more primitive than the brain teaches important lessons about big data in biology. Chief among them is that physical laws, relationships among measured things that are always true, emerge out of chaos, not the other way around. Correct prediction (as opposed to incorrect prediction) from large data sets requires understanding of these laws. The reason is that the same processes that make them also make the system wildly error-intolerant if the errors are too large. This instability routinely causes computer simulations of even primitive systems to fail by enabling mistakes to cascade into ever worsening falsehoods. The more complex and sophisticated the system is, the more intolerant to errors it becomes.
Thanks largely to the invention of highresolution diffusion magnetic resonance imaging, the era of the connectome is now upon us, and hopes are high that it might lead to a better understanding of the brain, and with luck also of the mind (Seung, 2012) . Wiser heads avoid speculating too much about the latter, for it is a rather large leap from the brain's anatomy to the brain's function. (Bargmann and Marder, 2013) Just how large is demonstrated by the present state of the genome (ENCODE Project Consortium, 2012; Graur et al., 2013) . We speak instead about learning more about the connections themselves and about advancing medicine (Van Essen and Ugurbil, 2012) . Nonetheless, behind the pure medical agenda is the natural desire all of us have to understand ourselves.
Right Answers from Wrong Equations
The deeper ambitions of physical research on living things require us to think hard about where meaning comes from in experimental science. We are obligated, in particular, to consider imperfection and the process of acquiring understanding in the face of it. This includes both measurement error and the absence of important information that we cannot yet obtain because we don't possess the enabling technology. The physics version of the concern is this: how is it ever possible to get correct answers starting from wrong equations? The biology version uses slightly different words but is fundamentally the same: how it is ever possible to get a correct understanding of something starting from flawed data and computer algorithms that somebody just made up? Computer programs and the data they use are synonyms for equations.
Concern about error control is not mere pedantry, for we know that it is generally impossible to piece together a correct picture of a complex system empirically from inadequate facts. One confronts this reality every day in chemistry and materials physics, disciplines similar to biology but dealing with issues that are simpler and thus easier to identify as problematic. The poster child of this epistemological barrier is high-Tc cuprate superconductivity, a matter that has remained unsolved for almost three decades despite measurement technology vastly more sophisticated than any presently used in life science (Sebastian et al., 2014) . The corresponding mass of high-quality data is comparable to that of the human connectome. The failure is doubly shocking given the simplicity and experimental relevance of the underlying equations, which are known exactly. Much of the (excellent) theoretical activity has been dedicated to solving these equations with sufficient accuracy to make good experimental predictions. The continued failure to achieve this goal speaks for itself. Physics and chemistry have had tremendous successes too, the digital computer being one of them, but success has always involved something beyond big data and deduction from microscopics.
Emergent Law
The answer to how we can master things even with imperfect experiments is known in physical science and codified mathematically in something called the renormalization group (Laughlin, 2005) . In short, nature organizes itself. When it does, certain measured properties at long length and time scales become universal, and quantitative relationships among them develop into laws we can then use for engineering. The rigidity and elasticity of all solids is always the same. The special properties of insulators, semiconductors, and metals that allow us to make computers with them are always the same. The rigid orientation of ferromagnets is always the same. Emergent universality causes sample variations and imperfections to heal away as the size grows, so they don't matter to the things one is measuring. Yet the laws vanish away to nothingness when one takes the system apart to see how it works. Compressional sound is universal in all macroscopic matter, but compressional sound is a non sequitur in a small molecule. Superconducting properties are exact, yet there is no such thing as a superconducting atom.
Emergent self-organization is a familiar concept in biology. There is a significant scientific literature on it, and it has inspired a body of thoughtful artistic work, such as that shown in Figure 1 . The physics version is less obvious, among other reasons because nature also has laws that don't emerge but just are (as far as we know), and we tend to categorize these as causes of things rather than consequences of them. However, emergent physical law exists as well, and it is exceedingly important. Without it we would not be able to navigate through our confused environment with information from our senses that is imperfect. We would also not be able to reliably engineer things to do our bidding. There are also reasons to suspect that the mysterious biological form of emergence and the simpler physical kind are related and may even be one and the same.
Brain Self-Organization It is perfectly obvious that something like this is going on in the brain. All rabbits run away from foxes, yet a fertilized rabbit egg contains no specific antifox gene. The nervous system invents itself as it grows, just the way the body itself does, in ways that are highly predictable but that we don't yet understand. The human genome (and also the rabbit genome) is only about 3,200 megabase pairs long, or 800 megabytes in computer parlance. This small data file encodes every aspect of the mind-fear, love, hate, jealously, curiosity, mechanical ability, speech ability, social ability, creative ability-plus all the engineering specifics of the body. The human connectome database, by contrast, will approach 1 petabyte when it is completed, or 1.2 million times the size of the genome (Sporns, 2012) . The statistical principles of information theory constrain this process like iron (Cover and Thomas, 2006) : a machine that converts the genome logically to the connectome can make such a gargantuan increase in size only if (1) the information in the connectome is massively redundant or (2) details of the connectome are determined by nongenetic inputs from the environment. In other words, noise. The latter scarcely makes sense if one is trying to make a rabbit that always runs from foxes.
Decision Instability
Unhappily, emergent universality always goes hand-in-hand with decision instability. This relationship is easy to understand. If one changes the instructions for making a rabbit a little bit, emergent principles will guarantee that there is no effect, and one still get a rabbit. But if one changes the instructions a lot, one gets something else, perhaps an ocelot, although more likely an animal with disease. The ocelot instructions would likewise have a region of stability. Between this region and the rabbit region there would necessarily lie at least one boundary where the system became violently unstable, as it was deciding which of the two animals to be. At this boundary, arbitrarily small perturbations would make huge, qualitative changes to the outcome.
Emergence in sophisticated things is therefore a pact with the devil: on the one hand it gives us tolerance of small errors; on the other it gives us intolerance for larger ones. We call a system with a huge number of distinct stable basins of attraction, and thus global intolerance for error, complex. By this we simply mean that we ourselves have trouble anticipating what the system will do when its parameters are changed. Complex things, such as the brain, are ultrasensitive to details by definition. That's what it means for them to be complex! Experience with decision instability in the more primitive sciences has been extremely negative. In the cuprate superconductor problem, for example, one has a dense set of delicately balanced structural phase transitions involving both antiferromagnetism and superconductivity. Samples are difficult to make clean enough to distinguish the phases experimentally, measurements are difficult to perform, and there are reproducibility issues. The data sets are massive.
People fit ever more sophisticated mathematical models to parts of them (but not to other parts), declare their model to be the more insightful truth, and fight over who has been more clairvoyant. But in fact the entire modeling endeavor makes no sense when one has decision instability. Models are simply sets of equations that are wrong. They have meaning, if at all, only when they agree with each other. They do this only if there is emergent universality.
The Play Conundrum
The inherent difficulty in transitioning from anatomy to function in the brain is nicely illustrated by the problem of play (Burghardt, 2005) . There is a large behavioral science literature on play, for it is a fascinating aspect of the human condition and also something we have in common with higher animals. It is also strangely difficult to define. What exactly is play? What is a kitten doing when it bats around a yarn ball? What are turtles doing when they swim repeatedly through hoops or bounce balls about with their snouts? There is a famous quote by Jean Piaget that play is the answer to how anything new comes about. In scholarly work one likes to be as objective as possible, so one defines play through such things as activity an animal engages in voluntarily and repeatedly, and for no apparent purpose. But ultimately we recognize play in animals because we just do. Playfulness is something we have in common with them, and perhaps even with all living things, even plants (Baluska and Mancuso, 2009 ). Where does play reside in the brain?
An important clue as to the nature of play is provided by the observation of easily recognizable play in the common octopus (Kuba et al., 2006) . The octopus is a highly advanced and intelligent creature, so the fact that it does something we also do is not that surprising at first. But then one realizes that either (1) play is emergent behavior so highly beneficial in natural selection that it evolved separately and in great detail in mollusks and chordates or (2) play is not emergent but something highly atavistic, an engineering principle of life powerfully preserved for at least 600 million years (Brown, 1998) . We have no common ancestor with the octopus since before the Cambrian.
Engineering Principle
There are two good reasons to suspect the engineering explanation of play as being the right one. One is that nobody can think of a way that play might have evolved in machines, such as computers, based on reason. One can always argue that natural selection can do anything it likes, but one prefers to have hypothetical details fill in when one argues this way, and that has not happened. By contrast, many people have thought of ways that natural selection might have created logic out of something else (Cooper, 2004) . This is also roughly consistent with what is known about early childhood development (Forman and Kraker, 1985) . The other is that simple chemical reactions can play (Epstein and Showalter, 1996; Ivanov and Mizuuchi, 2010) . As always, categorizing behavior as play is somewhat in the eye of the beholder, so a more accurate statement would be that simple reactions can manifest sophisticated chaotic dynamics, like those of the weather, in which small changes in initial conditions make enormous changes in what happens later. But categorization as play in this case is also apt because these chaotic chemical reactions are the intellectual cousins of cellular automata, extremely simple computer programs that generate a bewildering variety of behaviors that people tend to recognize as life-like and treat as games (Adamatzky, 2010) .
It is not controversial that neurons do playful things. They deploy themselves somewhat haphazardly in glial matter, exhibiting no lateral crystalline order. They arborize with each other in ways that resemble tree branches and roots. They possess on-board memory that responds to incoming signals in an agent-based way and changes the signals they themselves generate (Kandel, 2001) .
What Might Be Missing
If we suspend disbelief for a moment and consider the possibility that play might be a design principle rather than a higher emergent phenomenon, a simple idea presents itself as to why making sense of the connectome might be so difficult. The latter includes things like obtaining the entire map of C. elegans and finding that it still doesn't make any sense, and that it even has no action potentials (Gao and Zhen, 2011) . It is a small step from systems that play without direction to systems that play with rules, and from there to systems that play games with each other. Were that to happen, it could easily account for something as complicated as the brain, for it is well known from the study of automata that simple systems playing games can create enormously complex structures with very sophisticated functions. It is also known that small changes in the rule base can make enormous changes in the structures that develop. There is also the obvious example of the human economy, a thing that grows out of simple rules of money exchange that transcends anyone's attempt to understand and manage it. One of the economy's physical manifestations is a great network of highways with mighty cities at its hubs. It would obviously be a fool's errand to try understanding the economy by mapping its roads.
There is nothing supernatural or unscientific in the concept of gaming making a brain, or for that matter an entire organism. All that is required is an intermediate stage of organization that is unstable, like the weather. Physical science tells us that unstable development can be perfectly deterministic yet difficult, if not impossible, to follow by experiment, among other reasons because unstable evolution is functionally the same thing as cryptography. Thus the scientific resolution of the whole mystery might simply be that the genome instructs the system to go wild and generate a bag of tools and parts it might need to construct something interesting, and then sends a subsequent instruction to go out and play. Emergent self-organization then finishes the job.
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